4 research outputs found

    Classifying Sequences of Extreme Length with Constant Memory Applied to Malware Detection

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    Recent works within machine learning have been tackling inputs of ever-increasing size, with cybersecurity presenting sequence classification problems of particularly extreme lengths. In the case of Windows executable malware detection, inputs may exceed 100100 MB, which corresponds to a time series with T=100,000,000T=100,000,000 steps. To date, the closest approach to handling such a task is MalConv, a convolutional neural network capable of processing up to T=2,000,000T=2,000,000 steps. The O(T)\mathcal{O}(T) memory of CNNs has prevented further application of CNNs to malware. In this work, we develop a new approach to temporal max pooling that makes the required memory invariant to the sequence length TT. This makes MalConv 116×116\times more memory efficient, and up to 25.8×25.8\times faster to train on its original dataset, while removing the input length restrictions to MalConv. We re-invest these gains into improving the MalConv architecture by developing a new Global Channel Gating design, giving us an attention mechanism capable of learning feature interactions across 100 million time steps in an efficient manner, a capability lacked by the original MalConv CNN. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/NeuromorphicComputationResearchProgram/MalConv2Comment: To appear in AAAI 202

    The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation

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    This report surveys the landscape of potential security threats from malicious uses of AI, and proposes ways to better forecast, prevent, and mitigate these threats. After analyzing the ways in which AI may influence the threat landscape in the digital, physical, and political domains, we make four high-level recommendations for AI researchers and other stakeholders. We also suggest several promising areas for further research that could expand the portfolio of defenses, or make attacks less effective or harder to execute. Finally, we discuss, but do not conclusively resolve, the long-term equilibrium of attackers and defenders.Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge, Center for a New American Security, Electronic Frontier Foundation, OpenAI. The Future of Life Institute is acknowledged as a funder
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